Judicial Non-Compliance with Fourth Amendment Requirements in the Case of a Wired Informer, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1972 Issue 1 
January 1972 
Judicial Non-Compliance with Fourth Amendment Requirements 
in the Case of a Wired Informer, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745 (1971) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Judicial Non-Compliance with Fourth Amendment Requirements in the Case of a Wired Informer, United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), 1972 WASH. U. L. Q. 137 (1972). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss1/9 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENTS
JUDICIAL NON-COMPLIANCE WITH FOURTH AMENDMENT
REQUIREMENTS IN THE CASE OF A WIRED INFORMER
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
In 1966 defendant was convicted of federal narcotics violations.1
The government's case was largely based on the testimony of federal
narcotics agents about the content of several conversations between
the defendant and a government informer.2 The informer carried a
radio transmitting device which enabled the agents to monitor con-
versations that took place in various locations-including the defend-
ant's home during a one month period. The agents did not obtain a
search warrant authorizing their activities.
During the trial the defense objected to the admission of the agents'
testimony, contending that the eavesdropping techniques employed by
the government violated White's fourth amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.3 These objections were over-
ruled.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the convic-
tion.4 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed.5 Held:
1. 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) (1954), repealed Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, Title IM § 1101(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292. 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1954), re-
pealed Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title Ill, § 1101(a)(2), 84 Stat. 1291.
2. The informer himself did not testify, the prosecution being unable to locate
him. 401 U.S. 745, 753-54.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
4. 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969). The court read Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) as overruling On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), a case
involving a fact pattern almost identical to White. A further aspect of the case will
not be discussed in this comment, that being the effect of the ruling in Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1968), that Katz was to be applied prospectively only.
The events in White occurred prior to the Katz holding.
5. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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the use of a wired informer to enable agents to monitor conversa-
tions between the defendant and the informer does not violate
the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures.6
Eavesdropping, though often viewed as an unsavory technique,7 has
been employed by law enforcement agencies to detect and combat
crime with little judicial disapproval unless the government committed
a trespass. The advent of electronic eavesdropping had no immediate
impact on the court's traditional "trespass" criterion. In the first elec-
tronic eavesdropping case to come before the Supreme Court, Goldman
v. United States," the police placed a detectaphone against the wall of
an office adjoining the defendant's office in order to hear his end of
a telephone conversation. The Court, employing the same rationale to
avoid the fourth amendment standard of "reasonableness" as it em-
ployed in the landmark wiretapping case,9 held that (1) there could be
no search and seizure without an actual trespass on the defendant's
person or property; (2) the fourth amendment protects only persons,
places and things, not oral statements.' 0 The defense's attempt to dis-
tinguish eavesdropping from wiretapping on the basis of privacy ex-
pectations failed, the Court holding that there was not rational distinc-
tion between them."
6. The Court of Appeals erred in reading Katz as overruling On Lee. Other
circuit courts faced with interpreting the Katz holding failed to read in it an over-
ruling of On Lee and upheld similar government activity: Koran v. United States,
408 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 948 (1971); United States v.
Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1969); Dancy v. United States, 390 F.2d 370 (5th Cir.
1968); Holt v. United States, 404 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1968). But see Doty v.
United States, 416 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1968).
7. Blackstone refers to eavesdroppers as those who "listen under walls or win-
dows or the eaves of houses, and hearken for discourse, and thereupon frame slander-
ous and mischievous tales, and are a common nuisance." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, Com-
N'rARIms * 168.
8. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
9. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
10. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942).
11. Thereafter the fruits of electronic eavesdropping could be excluded only if the
police had committed a trespass. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913) (evi-
dence obtained in violation of a constitutional provision excluded from a federal court
proceeding). Congress responded to the Supreme Court's Olmstead ruling by pass-
age of the 1934 Federal Communications Act prohibiting the interception and divul-
gence of wire communications, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to prohibit
the admittance of wiretapping evidence in a court proceeding, Nardonne v. United
[Vol. 1972:137
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The trespass doctrine was denounced in Silverman v. United
States'2 and finally disposed of in Katz v. United States.'3  The Court in
Katz, with only one dissenting vote (but with three separate concurring
opinions) held that the government's use of a listening device outside
a telephone booth constituted a search in spite of the absence of tres-
pass, thus destroying the trespass rationale which supported both the
wiretapping and eavesdropping cases. The Court stated that "the fourth
amendment protects people, not places"'14 and that it is one's privacy
expectations which are determinative. The Court conceded that the po-
lice probably could have obtained a search warrant, but, in the absence
of a warrant, the search was unreasonable.
Informers' testimony on the other hand, has consistently been uti-
lized by the government both prior to and during the judicial proceed-
ing with almost no judicial disapproval. 5 The supporting rationale
is basically that each person runs the risk that what he tells another
might be relayed to the police and used to incriminate him. The courts
have been very reluctant to limit, in any way, the use of such testi-
mony, even when the informer was an agent of law enforcement of-
ficers. For example, in Hofa v. United States,16 a union official under
indictment was released from jail when he promised to be an "ear" for
the police, who were interested in discovering any possible illegal
activities surrounding Hoffa's "Test Fleet" trial. Through the informer
who worked his way into the Hoffa camp, the police gathered enough
evidence to convict Hoffa and others for attempting to bribe "Test
Fleet" jurors. 17 The Court rejected Hoffa's argument that his fourth
amendment rights had been violated stating that Hoffa was not relying
on the security of the hotel room, where some of the conversations
took place, but rather was relying on his misplaced confidence that the
informer would not reveal Hoffa's wrongdoing.' 8
States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). There was no immediate Congressional response to
Goldman although the Court there found no rational or logical distinction between
wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping.
12. 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. Id. at 351.
15. The only Court interference has come when the police have been guilty.
16. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
17. Chief Justice Warren dissented vigorously in Hoffa, viewing the introduction
of Partin (informer) into Hoffa's camp as distasteful. He would set up some guide-
lines for the use of informers to protect citizens from the guileful use of "friends."
Id. at 313-21.
18. Id. at 302.
Vol. 1972:137] 139
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Government agents can likewise misrepresent themselves as law-
breakers 9 without violating an unsuspecting defendant's fourth amend-
ment rights.20 In short, the courts have consistently refused to protect
an individual from his misplaced confidence.
However, judicial response to government utilization of a technique
which combines electronic eavesdropping and an informer has not been
so clearly favorable. In On Lee v. United States,2" the government,
without antecedent judicial approval, placed a radio transmitter on an in-
former to enable him to monitor conversations between the informer
and the defendant. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, held that
because there was no trespass, the government's use of the wired in-
former could not constitute a search in the fourth amendment sense.
Four justices in four separate dissents objected to the techniques
employed by the police. Justice Douglas quoting extensively from
Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States warned of the demise of
the fourth amendment's intended privacy protections. Justice Frank-
furter labeled the governmental techniques "dirty business" which
would spawn "lazy" and "immoral" police practices. 22
The propriety of similar government techniques arose again in Lopez
v. United States.23 A government official carried a tape recorder on
visits to the defendant's office to record an attempted bribe. The
tape recording was admitted into evidence to corroborate the official's
testimony at a subsequent criminal proceeding. Although the majority
approved of the unwarranted technique, four justices believed that On
Lee should be overruled, and three of them objected to the admission
of the tape recording, again echoing Brandeis' concern for privacy.
These justices contended that because of the nature of instantaneous
monitoring and recording, the threat to individual privacy was far
greater than that posed by traditional eavesdropping techniques. 24 Re-
flecting on the founding fathers' purpose in writing the fourth amend-
19. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
20. See Note, Police Undercover Agents-New Threat to First Amendment, 37
GEO. WASH. L. RaV. 634, 652-58 (1968-69).
21. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
22. Id. at 758-62.
23. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
24. Justice Brennan dissenting, "Electronic aids add a whole new dimension to
eavesdropping. They make it more penetrating, more indiscriminate, more truly ob-
noxious to a free society. Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police omniscient;
and police omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny." 373 U.S. 427
at 466.
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ment,2  they sought to bring these modem innovations within the limi-
tations set up by that amendment. Chief Justice Warren, believing that
On Lee should not be revitalized, conceded that advanced techniques
in electronics pose constitutional problems, but did not believe the use
of all such electronic devices was unconstitutional or unfair law en-
forcement practices.26 Warren distinguished the use of the transmitter
employed in On Lee and in Lopez, stating that in Lopez the transmitter
was used to corroborate the informer's testimony but he could "not
sanction by implication the use of these same devices to radically shift
the pattern of presentation of evidence in the criminal trial, a shift that
may be used to conceal substantial factual and legal issues concerning
the rights of the accused and the administration of criminal justice."' 7
A first step in applying the fourth amendment to wired informer
situations was achieved by two decisions which intervened between On
Lee and Lopez, holding that verbalizations (intangible evidence) were
within the scope of fourth amendment protections. 28  Then came the
Court's ruling in Osborn v. United States,2 9 which sanctioned the re-
cording of a conversation by a participant, but only because (1) antece-
dent approval from a judge had been obtained and (2) the scope of the
activity was particularly limited to meet forth amendment standards.30
The majority opinion pointed out that the recording conformed to the
standards set up by both the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Lopez. 31 The following year the Court held in Berger v. United States32
that a New York statute which regulated the use of eavesdropping
by law enforcement officers, including antecedent judicial approval, was
unconstitutional for failing to meet the particularity requirement of
the fourth amendment. 33  While Berger dealt with the constant
25. For an excellent discussion of the background of the fourth amendment, see
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Implicit in the discussion of fourth
amendment rights are fifth amendment rights also.
26. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (concurring opinion).
27. Id. at 445-46.
28. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1962); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963), both of these cases dealt with searches without warrants.
29. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
30. Id. at 330.
31. Id. at 327.
32. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
33. The particularity requirement set forth in the fourth amendment contains:
1. warrants issued only upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and
2. particularity describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
Vol. 1972:137]
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electronic surveillance of an office rather than intermittant eaves-
dropping, the case made clear that if the use of electronic equipment
cannot be strictly controlled to meet fourth amendment standards, then
"the 'fruits' of eavesdropping devices are barred under the fourth
amendment. '34  These two decisions then significantly restrict the use
of electronic eavesdropping devices.
However, none of these post-On Lee cases clearly resolved the cen-
tral issue in White-whether warrantless electronic eavesdropping us-
ing a wired informer is constitutional. Though Katz was interpreted
by the Court of Appeals in White as controlling, it did not deal with
a consenting participant, as did White, Osborn, On Lee and Lopez,
thus explaining the apparent unanimity in excluding the evidence in
Katz.35  In fact, Justice White, the author of the plurality opinion in
White, made it a point to mention in his concurring opinion in Katz
that On Lee and Lopez were unaffected by that decision.
There is little doubt that cases before the Katz decision discarded
the trespass doctrine, thereby overruling at least part of On Lee."0 Yet,
it has been contended that On Lee was fatally eroded even prior to
Katz,37 and that recent decisions which have broadened the definition of
search,38 limited the scope of permissible searches,3 9 and required con-
formity to fourth amendment standards for the enlarged category
of searches, 40 have discredited the whole On Lee rationale.
But although White reaffirms On Lee, it is questionable how much
of On Lee has been revived. Whether the traditional acceptance of an
34. Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967).
35. Another explanation for the unanimity is that Katz put to rest, once and for
all, that increasingly uncomfortable trespass rationale first enunciated in Olmstead.
For a long time it had been felt that to rest a personal protection doctrine on a prop-
erty law concept was unsupportable. The "constitutionally protected areas" doctrine
of Lanza v. United States, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), the then latest renovation of the tres-
pass rationale, failed to foreclose the inevitable doom of the rationale which Katz
finally tolled.
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
37. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 774 (1971).
38. Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323 (1966).
39. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (any restraint of the person whatsoever sub-
ject to judicial inquiry for reasonableness); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(evidence from unlawful searches and seizures inadmissible in criminal trial in state
courts).
40. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative searches
must comply with fourth amendment).
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informer's testimony as seen in Hoffa is foremost in the Court's mind
is not certain. It is clear that the government may no longer use elec-
tronic devices, with few exceptions,4' to gain access to a conversation
it otherwise would be unable to overhear without first obtaining a war-
rant.42 On the other hand, it may still use informers and agents to
seek out and gather evidence without warrants.43 The question is
whether a warrant requirement should be imposed when both an in-
former and a listening device are utilized. White answers this ques-
tion by reading Katz narrowly, limiting the warrant requirements to elec-
tronic devices only. If a liberal reading were given to Katz, any use
of electronic devises would have to meet the particularity requirements
of the fourth amendment, even when coupled with the use of an in-
former. But the objects of a conversation, which has not yet taken
place, cannot often be particularly described. The ease with which a
search warrrant can be obtained, depending on the varying require-
ments of different judges, emphasizes the problem of judicial noncom-
pliance with the particularity requirements of the fourth amendment.
It also raises the question of just what purpose a search warrant serves.
An important consideration in the use of electronic devices coupled
with the use of an informer is its admission into evidence. Chief Justice
Warren's concurring opinion in Lopez is concerned with the admission
of an informer's testimony without the corroboration of the tape re-
cording. A tape recording used as the only evidence of an illegal
transaction is not open to impeachment, as would be an informer's
testimony. Nor would the admission of the testimony of the informer
alone be desirable, for in the end it would be one man's word against
another's. The use of the tape recording serves to protect the credi-
bility of the informer. Thus the most desirable evidence would be the
testimony of an informer coupled with the tape recording, but neither
of these admitted alone would serve the best interests of the accused
or the administration of criminal justice.
Vhite then stands as a significant setback to those urging the use of
the fourth amendment to control government electronic eavesdropping.
It, in effect, offers the government a way of avoiding the effect of Katz
by interjecting an informer into the scheme. A possible explanation
for this judicial withdrawal from a controversial area is the entrance
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1967).
42. Id. at 357.
43. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1966).
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of Congress into the field through the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968. 44 Justice White does make a reference to it in his
opinion.4 r This, of course, does not prevent the Court from applying
fourth amendment standards to electronic eavesdropping, as many peo-
ple both on and off the Court have recommended. 46 But in light of the
Court's difficulty in rationalizing an extension of constitutional safe-
guards in this area, it may well leave the line drawing to Congress.
44. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1968).
Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 permits wire-
tapping and electronic eavesdropping by federal and state law enforcement officers
providing they have obtained a court order authorizing the interception. The Act
delineates the circumstances in which the order will be granted and the form the au-
thorization is to take. No authorization is necessary when one of the participants has
consented to the interception. The Act also prohibits all wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping by private individuals unless there is the consent of one of the partici-
pants in the conversation.
For more discussion of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
discussing jurisdictions with statutes authorizing or approving the interception of wire
or oral communications during a one year period see 117 CONG. REc. § 6476-81 (daily
ed. May 10, 1971) and 117 CONG. Rnc. § 20041-46 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1971).
45. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Accord, Comment, Electronic Surveillance: The New
Standards, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 49 (1968); Note, Eavesdropping Provisions of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Sale Streets Act of 1968: How Do They Stand in Light
of Recent Supreme Court Decisions? 3 VAXPAiuso L. Rav. 89 (1968).
46. Fourth Amendment Limitations on Eavesdropping and Wiretapping, 16 CLEV.
MAR. L. Rv. 467 (1967); Comment, Fourth Amendment and Electronic Eavesdrop-
ping: Katz v. United States, 5 HOUSTON L. REv. 990 (1968); Note, Constitutional
Law: The Validity of Eavesdropping under the Fourth Amendment, 51 MARY. L. REv.
96 (1968); Note, Eavesdropping and the Constitution: A Reappraisal of the Fourth
Amendment Framework, 50 MrNN. L. REV. 378 (1965-66); From Private Places to
Perstonal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 968 (1968); Note, Constitutional Law-Electronic Surveillance by Bugged Agents-
Is Electronic Surveillance By Bugged Agents a Search and Seizure Within the Fourth
Amendment? 14 ViLL. L. Rav. 758 (1969).
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